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BOOK REVIEWS
sent out to perform services, the extraterritorial provision applying
irrespective of whether or not the contract of hiring was made in the
state; nor do these statutes require that the employee be a resident
of the state. Johnson v. Falen, 65 Idaho 542, 149 P. (2d) 228
(1944); House v. State Industrial Acc. Commission, 167 Ore. 257,
117 P. (2d) 611 (1941); Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Dixon,
145 S. W. (2d) 620 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940). Although the facts of
the instant case indicate that the employment outside the state was
not incidental to employment inside the state, the court did not base
its decision on this distinction. Rather it denied relief because the
employee was not a resident and the contract had not been made
within the state. This is a far different basis of decision than the
above mentioned cases.
It is seen that many of these compensation acts expressly or impliedly provide that the act shall apply to injuries incurred outside
the jurisdiction of the state. However this is generally true only under certain specified conditions. While a few omit all reference to
extraterritorial application, a large number, as in the Michigan statute,
expressly provide that the acts shall not apply to injuries received outside the state unless the employee is a resident and the contract of
hire is concluded within the state. Where this is true, it would seem
that under facts similar to the principal case, recourse can be had
only to legislative amendment. The compensation law is a purely
legislative creation and is in derogation of the common law, and therefore permits no enlargement of its express terms by principles of common law or equity. Tews v. C. F. Hanks Coal Co., 267 Mich. 466,
255 N. W. 227 (1934). Under the facts of the instant case, the
Michigan court arrived at the only solution compatible with the express provisions of the statute.
Andrew V. Giorgi
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THE GROWTH OF ArmmIcAN LAW, Tzm LAW MAXERS. By James
Willard Hurst.' Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1950. Pp. xiii,
502. $5.50.-This fine work might well have been provided with a
more revealing title. For it is not, as one might suspect, just another
series of popularized biographies of great law-men, like Seagle's Men
of Law or Wormser's The Law, but a comprehensive highly rewarding
history of the distinctive contributions of each of the several institutions which have collaborated to make the law of America. Scholarly as well as readable, it is a remarkably complete study of a tre1 Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin.
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mendous mass of material, although for some reason not made clear,
it stops short at the year 1940.
Professor Hurst lists as the great American law makers, the legislature, the courts, the constitution-draftsmen, the bar and the executive, the last including t4e "administrative agencies." A worthwhile
addition would have been a separate account of the part played by
the law schools and law professors in making the law, at least since
1932. The numerous scattered references to the work of the schools
indicate that the author could have handled such a job very competently.
The author's views are, for the most part, mature and sound, and
often his comments are telling hits at weaknesses of the institutions
he describes. For instance, he notes that the legislative bodies, although largely made up of lawyers, have failed to develop standards
of fair ,and orderly procedure in their investigative activities comparable to that of the courts. Other weaknesses or sources of weakness, in the legislative bodies are, he finds, their "localism," high
turnover of membership, delays, bi-cameralism, dependence on "tight
inner leadership," and failure to develop adequate agencies to relieve
the members of mountains of detail. An interesting suggestion the
author makes is that legislators be required to make full disclosure of
the sources and extent of their incomes and their business connections
and act.vities during their terms.
The courts too are charged, and rightly so, with another kind of
"localism"--their lack of authoritative control. Historically, it is shown
that the increasing volume of court business in this country has been
met merely by increasing the number of courts and judges, with every
court and sometimes every judge enjoying a measure of autonomy.
Of course, judicial councils and similar bodies now operate in some
of the states, and the federal courts have a substantial echelon of administrative control. Perhaps some day real simplicity of structure
and control will be achieved, and at some distant time it is hoped
.that courts (and books on law) will have names that adequately explain their purpose and functions.
As to the bar, the author repeats and documents the ageless charge
that lawyers as a group have not played the constructive role open
to them, but have been much too preoccupied with the law as a game
of skill or as an instrument for personal ends. He hopefully predicts
that government intervention in all the corners of our economy may
eventually remove lawyers from their absorption in technique and
partisanship. The book contains striking proofs of the innate conservatism of lawyers, as sadly shown in the rocky road travelled by
every effort at procedural simplification. At various places in this
volume we find apparently authoritative data as to where lawyers

BOOK REVIEWS
come from, how they spend their time, and how much they obtain for
their services in money, prestige, and other intangibles. Pages 256
to 276 contain the finest brief history of legal education that this
reviewer has ever seen. Mention is made of the recent growth of
bar associations and the raising of entrance requirements for bar admission. There is reference to Tocqueville's early nineteenth century dictum that the bar was nearer to an aristocracy than any other
2
American group, and a hint that this remains true to some extent.
Professor Hurst finds that lawyers and their clients usually come
from the upper middle classes and that they tend to share the social
attitudes of this group.3 There is interesting information concerning
trends and changes in the character of law firms and law practice.
Surprisingly, it seems that the ratio of lawyers to population has not
changed much in the last century. This reviewer was glad to find
Professor Hurst included among those who do not subscribe to the
old legend that the bar is "over-crowded."
Adequate attention is devoted to the part played by executive
officers of government, especially governors, and by administrative
bodies in "making Law." I found this the least interesting part of a
thoroughly interesting book, probably because the same material has
been overworked in recent years.
Charles S. Desmond*

NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 1949. Vol. III. Edited by
Edward F. Barrett.' Notre Dame, Indiana: College of Law, University of Notre Dame, 1949. Pp. 152. $2.00.-This volume continues,
in a competent manner, the Notre Dame Natural Law Institute's
worthwhile contributions to the philosophy of law. The Institute
began in 1947 and since that time has published three volumes of
lectures, of which the book under review is the third. All of them
have maintained a high standard of scholarship and original thinking
within the framework of sound natural law doctrine.
There is a vast difference between original thinking and merely
deracinate novelty. The difference is the same as that which separates
the art of Michaelangelo or Peter Paul Rubens from some of the more
uncontrolled convulsions of surrealism and dadaism. In one sense,
2

Text, at 4, 250.

3 On the other hand, Justice Proskauer, an able and most experienced
observer, states in his book Segment of My Times that the New York bar is
no longer a homogenous group.
* Judge, New York Court of Appeals.
1

Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
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I suppose it is accurate to say that a really great thinker cannot be
original. He is always a copyist. He copies objective reality. He
takes things as they are. He is measured, in his knowledge, by the
existing natures and substances of realities. What is involved is that
unique, vital and mysterious confrontation of existential being and
mind with which we are concerned in the area of speculative truths.
The very adjective, speculative, indicates a seeing or vision. If you
see what is not there; if, in the act of seeing, you mutilate and destructively modify; you are the victim of hallucinations. You are not
a philosopher; nor indeed, a scientist.
On the other hand and in another very real sense, all knowing and
philosophizing expressed in language necessarily has practical and
artistic aspect. You might see that trutk but fail to express it or you
might express it so sketchily or with such imprecision that those who
hear and read what you say face an arid conceptualism. The symbolism of your words makes no contact with the reality that stands
massively before your intellectual vision.
This is not to suggest that any act of intellection, any process of
mental abstraction, or any speculative knowledge of truth is ever
going to be adequate and final. Reality is so profound and so rich
that it will always leave us with unplumbed depths of mystery and
with reaches filled with our ignorances. Still less can mere written essays
do complete justice to a great intellectual vision. Words are too often
and too necessarily inadequate instruments. Reality, weighted with
the heavy mass of truth, cannot easily float to the heaven of our
abstractions.
The four essays which constitute the volume under review live up
to the best traditions of speculative and practical thought. Their titles
and authors are: "The Natural Law and Common Law," by Richard
O'Sullivan; "The Natural Law and Constitutional Law," by Edward
S. Corwin; "The Natural Law and Canon Law," by Stephan Kuttner;
and "The Natural Law and International Law," by Carlos P. Romulo.
In each of these essays there are valuable insights and real contributions to natural law learning, although I think that the last is
less philosophical and more rhetorical than any of the others. Personally, I liked Doctor Kuttner's treatment of the natural law best of
all. He made some points which are, I think, too often neglected in
treatises on natural law.
Many quotable passages characterize most of the chapters in this
book, and I shall not be able to resist the temptation to exhibit a few
stimulating samples.
In an interesting style Mr. O'Sullivan's lecture illustrates and emphasizes a rather evident historical conclusion, namely, that the roots
of the early English common law are deeply embedded in natural law
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reasoning and method. He establishes, with a display of historical
erudition, that "during all of the centuries before the Reformation
the thought and language of the Common Lawyers followed a kind
of pattern or rhythm: the law of God, the law of nature, the law of
the land." 2
Because natural law philosophy and method regard the nature (in
the orders of specification and exercise) of man as a crucial standard,
and the myriad of existential realities or natures with which man is
concerned (in act and conduct) as auxiliary but subordinate standards, it is easy to see why in the making and application of laws, persons with natural law inspiration should conclude that ". . . 'the
sparks of all the sciences in the world are raked up in the ashes of the
law.' Natural law in the classical and Christian conception may be
said to mean the sum in order of the dynamic tendencies that are
proper to man as a rational being. Natural law has reference to the
internal tendency or thrust of things, their 'dynamisme original.' It is
rooted in the order of the world and in the conception of man as
a part of that order; in a study of the inner constitution of man,...
and the metaphysical foundations of our being." 3
In the Anglo-American tradition of common law the rule of reason
and argumentation from the natures of things rather than from their
names or mere appearances constitute a golden thread of the natural
law running through our whole jurisprudence.
Perhaps nowhere is the "higher law background" more apparent
in American law than in the field of Constitutional Law. That is why
Professor Corwin's contribution manifests an exceptional appreciation
of natural law implications in American constitutional developments.
His is the style, manner and scholarship of an outstanding exponent
of Constitutional Law. The "common right and reason" of Dr. Bonhamn's case are nothing but direct or indirect derivations from the
natural law. Corwin is supported by a vast armament of historical
research in his conclusion that the whole doctrine and practice of
judicial review in the United States traces back indirectly, if not
directly, to the genuine natural law tradition. For, ". . . judicial
review initially had nothing to do with a written constitution. In point
of fact, the first appearance of the idea of judicial review in this
country antedated the first written constitution by at least two
decades." 4
Very ingeniously does this author demonstrate the undeniable and
irresistible claims of natural law thinking upon man's legal reasonir-,.
He shows, despite protestations that judicial review today is confined
Text, at 31.
3 Text, at 39-40.
4 Text, at 58.
2
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within the four corners of our Constitution to the complete neglect
of natural law rights, "that in the very process of discarding the doctrine of natural rights and adherent doctrines . . . the courts have
contrived to throw about those rights . . . the folds of the documen-

tary Constitution." 5
In only one respect do I have the temerity to disagree with the
opinion of so eminent an authority in Constitutional Law. He believes
that the original significance of the due process clause in the American
Constitution was "purely procedural." 6
In this, it seems to me, he forgets the very natural law inspiration
which he finds omnipresent as a "background" of the Constitution.
It is the whole point of the natural law view and method to deal with
substance and natures rather than with forms, and to deal with forms
and procedures for the sake of substance and natures. Genuine respect
for the natures and subsisting reality of things would make pure procedure not relatively insignificant, but rather a means to an end. A
pure procedure is as impossible and as unthinkable as a ppure means,
i.e., one which is unrelated to an end. Whatever the emphasis on
procedure in the due process clause in the minds of the Founding
Fathers, surely they did not neglect the rule of reason behind "pure"
procedure. The due process clause provides that no persons shall "be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 7 That
meant moie than that the forms and procedure of law must be complied with. The due process clause can be regarded as the most concentrated statement of the natural law tradition in our Constitution.
Now, veritable natural law never in its long history tolerated everything that men have fashioned as or called laws. One of the glories
of the natural law tradition is that it is said to lawmakers and tyrants:
"Thus far shall you go and no furtherl" The Founding Fathers were
very familiar with the idea of limitation on the competence of man to
make laws. I cannot believe that they forgot about this limitation to
the extent of conceiving the due process clause as purely procedural.
Indeed, Corwin himself states, in the last paragraph of his essay,
"Our present interest ...

has been in Natural Law as a challenge to

the notion of unlimited human authority." 8
With the Canon Law resonances of Doctor Kuttner's article I am
not qualified to deal. They consist of a discussion of the natural law
background of the whole Canon Law and the natural law -implications or references contained in specific rules of the Canon Law. Thus,
Doctor Kuttner's article is a statement of the intersections of Canon
Law and natural law. But his presentation is more original and more
5

Text, at 62.

7
8

U. S. CoNST. AmND. V.

6 Text, at 68.
Text, at 81.

BOOK REVIEWS
significant than a mere rehearsal of the instances in which the Canon

Law reflects the natural law. A young seminarian, after a course of
Moral Theology and Canon Law, could collate such instances, if he
were willing to make the somewhat exacting research. What I par-

ticularly liked about Doctor Kuttner's article were the frequent flashes
of an exceptional appreciation of the function and nature of the
natural law that gleam from his lines. Here is no mere rechauffe of
remembered formulae from studied texts about natural law. Here is

the wisdom that flows from competent and mature reflection on the
natures of man and other things, so that he is able to express the
natural law insights accurately, in new ways and in a manner which
evidences how vital a hold they have upon his mind.
It is refreshing for example to come upon passages like the following in a day when every enthusiast of Catholic social philosophy seems
to live in the illusion that his opinions about what is right and wrong
in, for example, the field of Industrial Relations are direct and obvious
pontifications of the natural law: 9
The observation is age-old that in Natural Law not all judgments,
or precepts, or rights are evident to the same degree. Between the absolutely good and the absolutely evil act there is the immense sphere of
the "relative," the indifferent, the contingent, and the complex, where the
simple statement that the act acquires its goodness or badness from its
end leads only to the further question of proper ends, proper means,
and how to establish a right relation in the multitude of ends, values,
interests, goods, and rights. The judgment of right reason is therefore
anything but a judgment of "simple reason," unless we want to restrict
the subject matter of Natural Law to what is evident to children, or
self-evident. Man as man is never in the absolute (as far as the law
is concerned) but always in concrete relations. To judge whether the
concrete situation is just or unjust requires always a varying number
of considerations and ratiocinations, for %s to perform. Some of these
situations are given with social life as such; but we must insist that
even in regard to the most fundamental, to Life itself, the Natural Law
does not consist of a simple formula, "killing is bad," "not-killing is
good." What about self-defense? just war? Capital punishment?
Would we not reject, e.g., a legal order as against Natural Law which
excludes the right of self-defense? Both the fifth commandment and selfdefense are of Natural Law; yet defense can be excessive (as in the case
of a harmless aggressor; of a trifling object; of inadequate weapons);
again, the excess may be caused by overwhelming fright, etc. The ratio
naturalis consists of one all-comprehensive judgment only, but in a given
case its formulation may rest on a chain of conclusions which positive
law will have to express by a number of rules and exceptions. It cannot be said, e.g., that of the different treatment given by different penal
codes to excess in self-defense, one or the other must be "against" Natural Law. And the more we get away from the fundamental facts and
forms of life into the relations existing in highly organized society, the
more the technical, conventional regulation enters into the proper determination of wrong and right. What is Natural Law in regard to the
9 Text, at 101-2.
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buying and selling of shares on the stock-exchange? Or to the ordination of a cleric outside his home diocese? It would be folly to expect
in such situations a detailed answer from "pure" Natural Law, or to
say that a given set of rules in such situations is the only possible determination of Natural Law. (Emphasis supplied.)

I make no apologies for selecting a quotation of this length; it would
be unjust to Doctor Kuttner if I mutilated this characteristic sample
of his essay.
The less profound generalities of the last essay point out how the
path of natural law meets with the path of modem international law.
The agreement of so many United Nations representatives of widely
disparate cultures, religions and philosophies upon a declaration of
the "universal rights of man" is no accident of political persuasion and
oratory. It is natural law thinking whether acknowledged or not.
The Natural Law Institute deserves the commendation of all who
wish to provide a sound philosophical platform for the fundamental
decencies by which civilization and culture are sustained. I suppose
that positivists, and those who have a small appreciation of natural
law as Oliver Wendell Holmes had, will find little of interest in this
volume. But after all if a book does not interest everybody, it is not
always the fault of the book.
Godfrey P. Schmidt*

LAW OF THE Am: CASES AND MATERIALS. By Clarence E. Manion.'
Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1950. Pp. xi, 689.
$7.50.-The advent of the age of flight and electronic communication
has not only radically changed the mode of living of most of the inhabitants of this nation, but also has created a myriad of new legal
problems. These problems have been met, for the most part, by unrelated case law and haphazard piecemeal legislation. True, in recent
years great segments of the fields of air transportation and radio
communication have been subjected to well defined governmental regulation, particularly by the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Federal
Communications Commission. However, much has yet to be done in
the field of air law. To give the practitioner and the prospective practitioner a sufficient background of the problems and rules involved so
as to qualify him to deal with them adequately it is necessary that
there be a comprehensive and systematic approach to the whole interrelated field. This has been attempted by the author, and this reviewer believes that he has succeeded.
*

Lecturer in Law, Fordham University School of Law.
Dean of Law, University of Notre Dame.
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Further, the need of an up-to-date treatment of the subject is accentuated by the recent inception of television as a part of American
everyday life. This timely phase of air law is also covered by the
author.
The material is divided, to facilitate study, into two parts: aviation and communication. The first part contains a detailed treatment
of the rights and duties which arise from a consideration of the proposition that "the coming of the airplane has not taken away any of the
rights of the landowner to the use and enjoyment of his land and the
air space above it." 2 The questions of governmental regulation, liability in contract and tort, and criminal sanctions are better understood after the theories of ownership of airspace are definitely established and exhaustively considered. This is the thesis of the author in
arranging the subject matter of this part. The text of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 is likewise included because: 3
Since the enactment of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, practically every problem that can arise in the field of aviation law can
be solved by the application of some part of that act. The litigation

since 1938 has been largely in the construction of the various sections
of the act, or in the effort to reconcile conflicting theories as to the
application of the Act to the specific case.

Part II proceeds on the theory that the evanescence of practical
solutions in the field of communications precludes the consideration
of everything save fundamental legal principles.4 Nevertheless, there
is a detailed examination of the regulation, licensing, and financing
of radio broadcasting stations. This part concludes with the text of
the Communications Act of 1934 and a section devoted to television
and current state regulations thereof.
The cases and statutes are interspersed with supplementary textual
material highlighting and explaining information hitherto unemphasized. 5 The index reflects the care with which the basic materials were
prepared. It is more than the cursory appendage characteristic of
many case books. Comprising twelve per cent of the total work it
should prove invaluable to the lawyer or the law student.
2 Guith v. Consumers Power Co., 36 F. Supp. 21 (E. D. Mich. 1940);
text, at 158.
3 Text, at 255.
4 "A great many problems that will arise in connection with this new
mode of communications [television] can be solved by applying the well

settled rules of law that have developed in connection with radio law." Text,
at 619.
5 E.g.,

"...

there is no question now that the progress made by radio

in any of the countries can be measured by the amount of government control. The greatest advances are seen in the countries with the least governmental regulation." Text, at 513.
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Dean Manion has been successful in preparing a book for classroom
use on the Law of the Air. In addition to providing a comprehensive
text and case book it should serve as a ready reference to all persons
interested in the fundamental legal conceptions underlying aviation,
radio communication and television.
Robert E. Sullivan*

THE LAW. By Ren6 A. Wormser.1 New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc. 1949. Pp. xiv, 609. $5.00.--This is an excellent book for
laymen. The author relates the story of the development of the law
in terms of the great men responsible for its growth. In doing this,
he discusses not only the achievements of the legal scholars such as
Justinian, Coke, Blackstone, Marshall, Kent, Holmes, Pound, Brandeis, and Cardoza and many others, but also the contributions of the
saints, rulers, philosophers and presidents who have influenced the
progress of the law. Thus, the reader is introduced to St. Thomas
Aquinas and his great work on theology, to the legal philosophies of
Hobbes and Locke, to Jefferson's concepts of democracy, and to Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal. Each of these men, and many others
discussed or mentioned in this book, determined the course of the law
for years to come. The author is to be commended for attributing
the growth of law and its institutions to the work of these men as
well as to the efforts of great judges, lawyers, and teachers of jurisprudence. Praise is also due to him for interrelating the development
of law with mankind's progress in philosophy, religion, ethics and other
fields of endeavor.
There is a feature in this volume that deserves special mention.
Too many writers on legal history often ignore even the barest mention of canon law. Mr. Wormser's book contains a whole chapter on
this subject.2 He also has a part of a chapter on the Code Napoleon,
generally passed without notice.8 Further, his chapters on the origins
of commercial and maritime law are very well done, 4 and his more
extensive treatment of international law and of the organizations for
world accord is excellent. 5
Interspersed here and there in this readable work are bits of interesting legal lore which should prove fascinating to the reader interested
*

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
Practicing attorney and member of the New York Bar.

2
3
4

Text,
Text,
Text,
Text,

5

c. 17.
c. 22.
c. 42.
cc. 43, 44, 45, and 46.
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in the law. He will, for example, find out why even to this date an
English barrister has a pocket in the back of his black gown which he
wears in court, 6 and discover that the term "junior" has a particular
meaning in English legal practice. 7 The footnotes are instructive to
the layman, defining terms such as "entailing an estate" 8 or giving
the legal meaning of "fungible goods," 9 and noting many other facts
about law and law-makers. If there is any doubt as to the variety of
topics considered in this volume, one need only look in the index.
Among the hundreds of listed topics one can even find a reference to
the Homma case, the U. N., or the Talmud. Mr. Wormser has accumulated much information on the history of his profession-the lawand he wants his reader to at least have a glimpse of the materials.
While this book may be a storehouse of legal learning for laymen,
it will probably not appeal to the members of the profession who have
done some serious reading in legal history. There is too much written
within the confines of one volume, and, consequently, there is very
little analysis of the important trends that have characterized the
advances in legal thought. But, for the busy practitioner, this book
may be as interesting as it should be to the layman, and for some it
may even be the first step in a lasting acquaintanceship with the historical background and future aims of their profession.
Louis C. Kaplan*

Tim UNITED STATES CONGRESS:

ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE.

By Floyd M. Riddick.1 Washington: National Capitol Publishers,
1949. Pp. xi, 459. $4.50.-Dr. Riddick has done a thorough job with
this book. If there are questions about the organization and procedure
of Congress that cannot be answered by consulting these pages, they
indeed must be obscure. The book is a veritable encyclopedia of information on the subject, which, paradoxically, may be its greatest weakness. While the author has put life into the formal rules, for some
persons, they may still lack reader interest. But the facts are here.
The book begins with a discussion of the basic functions of Congress, moves through the political organization of the two houses, and
the official and unofficial organization with floor leaders, whips, and
6 Text, at 307.
7 Ibid.
8 Text, at 148.
9 Text, at 403.
* Attorney-Adviser, Legal Division, Public Housing Administration, Wash-

ington, D. C.
1 Senate Editor, DAiLY DrGEST of the CO NGSSoNAL REcoRD.
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steering committees. There is adequate treatment given to the officers
and employees of Congress and to the all-important committees. More
than half of the book is devoted to the details of procedure in the two
houses. Here Dr. Riddick draws upon his vast reservoir of knowledge
of how Congress does things other than by the strictly formal rules.
However, the latter are treated in extreme detail in step-by-step procedure. In this connection, in the preface, which was written by Professor Lindsay Rogers, the point is made that efficient government
"is more likely if there is a full understanding of the rules that the
two houses of Congress have and of how they are applied in practice.
To this high end Mr. Riddick's volume has made a notable contribution." 2 Worthy of mention is the fact that procedure in the Senate,
sometimes slighted in legislative discussion in favor of the House, is
here given full treatment. Finally the author examines the relations
between the President and Congress.
The effects of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 are discussed in detail. There is no attempt by Dr. Riddick to editorialize;
he has no suggestions for changes in Congress, for introduction of the
parliamentary system or other innovations, which, in this case, is all
for the good. This is not a controversial book. It covers factual information, much of which is not available elsewhere. The text is welldocumented with references to the Congressional Record and to the
various volumes of precedents. Tables, charts, and facsimile reproductions of congressional documents aid in the reader's grasping a proper
picture of Congress and its work. Illustrative examples constitute an
outstanding feature, and the author repeatedly proves his competence
to write such a book, which his intimate contact with Congress has
given to him, especially his Senate editorship of the "Daily Digest" of
the CongressionalRecord which he has held since 1946.
This is a noteworthy and valuable book. It has no competitor.
Paul C. Bartholomew*

BOOKS RECEIVED
CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONS
(Revised Edition). By
Charles Fairman. New York City: Henry Holt and Co., 1950.
Pp. xiv, 489. $2.75.

A.M ERicAN

By Rudolf B. Schlesinger.
The Foundation Press, Inc., 1950. Pp. xxxiv, 552.

CoMPARATIvE LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS.

Brooklyn:
$7.50.
2
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Inc., 1949. Pp. xiv, 609. $5.00.
LAW OF CADAVERS, THE: and of Burial and Burial Places. By Percival E. Jackson. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950. Pp.
Lxxxiii, 734. $12.50.
*LAW OF THE Am, CASES AN MATERIALS. By Clarence E. Manion.
Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1950. Pp. xi,

689. $7.50.
MANUAL OF PREVENTIVE LAW. By Louis M. Brown. New York City:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950. Pp. xix, 346. $5.00.
*NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 1949. Vol. III. Edited by

Edward F. Barrett. Notre Dame, Indiana: College of Law, University of Notre Dame, 1949. Pp. 152. $2.00.
*Reviewed in this issue.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT.

By Paul A. Freund. Bos-

ton: Little, Brown and Co., 1949. Pp. vi, 128. $3.00.
By Robert Calvert. Scarsdale, N. Y.: Scarsdale Press, 1950. Pp. xi, 371. $5.00.

PATENT PRACTICE AND MANAGEMENT.

LIFE INSURANCE TRUSTS. By Allan F. Smith. Albany
and New York City: Matthew Bender and Co., 1950. Pp. xi,
545. $10.00.

PERSONAL

PRIMER or PROCEDURE. By Delmar Karlen. Madison, Wis.: Campus

Publishing Co., 1950. Pp. xv, 525. $6.50.
AND THE LAW. By J. G. Moser and Richard A. Lavine. Los
Angeles, Calif.: Parker & Company, 1947. Pp. vii, 386. $12.50.

RADIO

SCHOOLS

OF

CORPORATE REFORM, THE. By Harold Gill Reuschlein.

Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1950. Pp. 117. $2.50.
SEGMENT OF My TIMES, A. By Joseph M. Proskauer. New York:

Farrar, Straus and Company, 1950. Pp. ix, 270. $3.00.
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT,

THE, 1950, with Explanation.

New York:

Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950. Pp. 130. $1.50.
By Robert L. Stem and Eugene Gressman. Washington, D. C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1950.
Pp. xiii, 553. $7.50.

SUPREME COURT PRACTICE.

*U. S. CONGRESS ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE, THE.

By Floyd M.

Riddick. Washington, D. C.: National Capitol Publishers, Inc.,
1950. Pp. xi, 459. $4.50.

*Reviewed in this issue.

